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Abstract
We consider a market with sequential consumer search in which rms can distin-
guish potential customers visiting for the rst time from returning visitors. We show
that rms often have an incentive to make it costly for its visitors to return after
investigating rivals, either by making an exploding o¤er(which permits no return
once the consumer leaves) or by o¤ering a buy-now discount (which makes the
price paid by rst-time visitors lower than that for returning visitors). Prices often
increase when return costs are articially increased in this manner, and this harms
consumers and market performance. If rms cannot commit to their buy-later price
the outcome depends on whether there is an intrinsic cost of returning to a rm: if
the intrinsic return cost is zero, it is often an equilibrium for rms not to o¤er any
buy-now discount; if the return cost is positive, rms are forced to make exploding
o¤ers.
Keywords: Consumer search, oligopoly, price discrimination, high-pressure selling,
exploding o¤ers, buy-now discounts, costly recall.
1 Introduction
In markets in which consumers sequentially search through available options, it is common
for a consumer to return to buy from a previously sampled seller only after investigat-
ing other sellers.1 In some circumstances, a seller may be able to distinguish potential
This paper replaces an earlier paper titled Conditioning prices on search behavior. We are grateful
to Simon Anderson, Marco Haan, Bruno Jullien, Preston McAfee, Meg Meyer, Andrew Rhodes, David
Sappington, Chris Wilson and Asher Wolinsky, and to the Economic and Social Research Council (UK)
and the British Academy for funding assistance.
1De los Santos (2008) presents a rare empirical study of consumer search behaviour prior to making a
purchase, using data from online book purchases. De los Santos (2008, section 4) nds that three-quarters
of consumers search only one retailer before making their purchase. Of the remaining consumers who
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customers who come to the store for the rst time from those who have returned after
a previous visit. A sales assistant may tell from a potential customers questions or de-
meanor whether she has paid a previous visit or not, or may simply recognize her face.
In online markets, a retailer using tracking software may be able to tell if a visitor has
visited the site before. Sometimes as with job o¤ers, tailored nancial products, medical
insurance, or home improvements a consumer needs to interact with a seller to discuss
specic requirements, and this process reveals the consumers identity. In these situations
where sellers can distinguish new from returning visitors, we argue that rms often have
an incentive to discriminate against returning visitors, either by using so-called exploding
o¤ers, which force the consumer to buy immediately or not at all, or by using buy-now
discounts, which o¤er rst-time visitors a lower price than return visitors.
Because they are often used somewhat informally or furtively, it is hard to produce
evidence of exploding o¤ers or buy-now discounts in consumer markets. One of the authors
encountered an in-home salesman of nancial products, and when he said he wished to
think about the o¤er and get back to the salesman, the salesman claimed it was his last
day in his current job. The use of buy-now discounts is plausible in retailing situations
where sales people have authority to o¤er discretionary discounts. For instance, one can
imagine a sales assistant in an electronics store o¤ering a customer a 10% discount if the
sale is made immediately (e.g., before the assistant leaves for the day). When searching
for air-tickets online, a consumer may nd a quote on one website, go on to investigate a
rival seller, only to return to the original website to nd the price has mysteriously risen.
One of the most notorious examples of high-pressure selling involves time-share vacation
homes, where potential customers are lured (often with promise of a gift) to listen to a
lengthy presentation about the properties, and then told they must buy immediately or
not at all (or o¤ered a discount o¤ the list price if they sign immediately).
There are potentially two broad reasons why a rm may wish to make it costly, or
impossible, for its rst-time visitors to return. First, there is a strategic reason, which is to
deter a potential consumer from going on to investigate rival and perhaps superior o¤ers.
If a consumer cannot return to a seller once she leaves, this increases the opportunity cost
of onward search, as the consumer then has fewer options remaining relative to situation
in which return is costless.2 Second, the observation that a consumer has come back to a
seller after sampling other options reveals relevant information about a consumers tastes,
and this may be a protable basis for price discrimination. A seller may wish to charge
a higher price to those consumers who have already investigated other sellers, because
search at least twice, approximately two-thirds buy from the nal rm searched and one-third go back
to a rm searched earlier. De los Santos also nds that the initial search is non-random, and one rm
(Amazon.com) was sampled rst by about two-thirds of all consumers making a purchase.
2Another strategic reason why a seller might try to force immediate sale is to prevent the consumer
having time to evaluate the current product adequately, rather than preventing the evaluation of rival
o¤ers. We discuss this alternative rationale in section 4.
2
their decision to return indicates they are unsatised with rival products.3 However, this
incentive is tempered by the fact that returning consumers also do not have a strong taste
for the rms own product, for otherwise they would have purchased immediately instead
of going on to investigate alternative sellers.
Our underlying framework is a sequential search model with horizontally di¤erentiated
products in which consumers search both for price and product tness, as introduced by
Wolinsky (1986). Each rm has two sources of demand: consumers who buy its product
on their rst visit to the rm (fresh demand), and consumers who sample the rm, go
on to sample rival products, but eventually come back to buy (returning demand). In
the standard search model, rms cannot distinguish between these two groups and so must
treat all visitors equally, while in this paper rms are able to discriminate between the two
groups. Using this basic market framework, we present two related models.
First, in section 2, we suppose that rms can employ one of just two return policies:
consumers can freely return after leaving the rm (and buy at the same price), or exploding
o¤ers are used and rst-time visitors are forced to buy immediately or never. We derive
the equilibrium price when all rms use exploding o¤ers, and show that typically it is
higher than the corresponding price with free recall. The use of exploding o¤ers also leads
to ine¢ cient matching between products and consumers. When a rm uses an exploding
o¤er, this makes those consumers with strong tastes for the rms product more likely to
buy immediately, but it prevents consumers with moderate tastes from returning after they
nd nothing better elsewhere. We show that rms wish to use exploding o¤ers when the
density for match utility is increasing, while when this density decreases rms choose to
allow free recall. In this model, only the strategic reason to make return costly is present,
as by construction rms make no sales to returning visitors.
Second, in section 3, we assume rms have a richer set of return policies to choose from,
and rather than simply banning return they can charge returning visitors a higher price;
that is, they can o¤er rst-time visitors a buy-now discount. Starting from a situation
in which all rms treat fresh and returning consumers equally, we show under relatively
mild conditions that a rm has an incentive to o¤er a buy-now discount. Compared to
the case with exploding o¤ers, a rm has a greater incentive to introduce these tari¤-
intermediated search frictions, because of the extra revenue generated from returning
buyers. In the specic example of duopoly and a uniform distribution for match utility, we
calculate the equilibrium prices for immediate and returning purchase, and nd that the
buy-now discount is largest when intrinsic search frictions are small. Because of the extra
search frictions introduced by the buy-now discount, even the discounted buy-now price is
3This contrasts with the substantial literature about how rms can use the information of consumer
purchase history to rene their prices. (See, for instance, Hart and Tirole (1988), Chen (1997), Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000), and Acquisti and Varian (2005).) These models often predict that a rm will price
low to a customer who previously purchased from a rival (or consumed the outside option in the case of
monopoly), since such a customer has revealed she has only a weak preference for the rms product.
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higher than the non-discriminatory price. As such, this form of price discrimination lowers
both consumer surplus and total welfare.
In section 3.3 we relax the assumption that rms commit to their buy-later price when
consumers make their rst visit. The outcome without commitment depends sensitively
on whether or not consumers face an intrinsic (as opposed to articially inated) cost of
returning to a previous rm. If there is no such cost, we show that it is often an equilibrium
for rms to o¤er uniform prices, i.e., the fact that a consumer has come back to a rm
after sampling other sellers may give no ex post incentive for a rm to raise its price. This
implies that the informational incentive to set higher prices to returning customers is often
non-existent, and it is the strategic impact on a consumers incentive to buy immediately
which is the dominant factor when a rm decides to make return costly. However, for
reasons akin to Diamonds (1971) famous paradox, when consumers do incur a positive
exogenous return cost (no matter how small), the unique credible outcome is that rms
make exploding o¤ers.
Our paper relates to several strands of the industrial organization literature. It is
complementary to the model of ordered search in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009).
The two papers use the same market model and focus on the same distinction between fresh
and returning demand, but there are two major di¤erences.4 First, Armstrong, Vickers,
and Zhou (2009) suppose that rms know something about their place in the consumer
search order and can set their price accordingly, while for the most part in this paper we
assume random search whereby rms do not know where they are in a consumers search
process.5 Second, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) assume that rms cannot directly
distinguish between fresh and returning demand and must treat both sets of consumers
equally, while this ability to distinguish between new and returning visitors lies at the
heart of the current analysis. In Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009), a rm which is
more prominent is predicted to set a lower price than its less prominent rivals. (If a
rm is far back in the search order, it knows that any consumer who reaches it must not
care for the products of its rivals, and so this rm has monopoly power over its consumers
and sets its price accordingly.) This reects the informational motive to set high prices to
consumers who have already sampled, and rejected, rival products.
Our analysis is related to models of search with (exogenous) costly recall. Janssen
and Parakhonyak (2010) study the optimal stopping rule when consumers care only about
price and must incur a cost to return to a previous rm. This stopping rule is signicantly
more complicated than when return is costless. When there are more than two rms, a
consumers stopping rule is non-stationary and her reservation surplus level depends on
her previous o¤ers. They show that equilibrium prices do not depend on the recall cost
4A third di¤erence is that the earlier paper relies heavily on an assumption that match utilities are
uniformly distributed, whereas here most of the analysis is more general.
5We discuss the impact of having one rm more prominent in section 4 below.
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(unlike our model, where prices are sensitive to the endogenously generated recall costs).6
Firms often benet from the reduction of consumer search intensity, since this usually
softens price competition. In our model, the buy-now discount or exploding o¤er serves
this purpose. Alternatively, Ellison and Wolitzky (2008) present a model with homogenous
products in which a consumers incremental search cost increases with her cumulative
search e¤ort. If a rm increases its in-store search cost (say, by making its tari¤ harder to
comprehend), this will make further search less attractive. They show that if the exogenous
component of search costs falls, rms will unilaterally increase their self-determined element
of search costs, with the result that equilibrium prices are unchanged. Though otherwise
very di¤erent, the two models study how search frictions are determined endogenously:
even if intrinsic search frictions are negligible, a market may su¤er from substantial search
frictions and high prices in equilibrium.
Our analysis of buy-now discounts is also somewhat related to the emerging literature
on auctions with a buy nowprice (see Reynolds andWooders, 2009, for instance). Online
auctions sometimes o¤er bidders the option to buy the item immediately at a specied price
rather than enter an auction against other bidders. In these situations, a seller has one
item to sell to a number of potential bidders, and so a bidder needs to pay a high buy-now
price in order to induce the seller from going on to search for other bidders by running an
auction, whereas our model involves sellers o¤ering a low buy-now price so as to induce a
buyer from going on to search for other sellers. Common rationales for buy-now prices in
auctions are impatience or risk-aversion on the part of bidders, neither of which is needed
in our framework with costly search.
As far as we know, our paper is the rst to study the use of exploding o¤ers in consumer
markets. In the alternative setting of matching markets, however, there are a number of
studies in which exploding o¤ers play a role. Exploding o¤ers are often used in specialized
labor markets, such as those for law clerks, sports players, medical sta¤, and student college
allocations. When exploding o¤ers are used, these markets have a tendency to unravel,
and employers compete to make earlier and earlier o¤ers. The result can be signicant
ine¢ ciency.7 Niederle and Roth (2009) run an experiment to measure the impact of a
policy which bans the use of exploding o¤ers in a laboratory matching market. They
nd that rms do tend to use exploding o¤ers when they are permitted to do so, and
the result is that matching occurs ine¢ ciently early and match quality is poor, relative to
6Daughety and Reinganum (1992) make the point that the extent of consumer recall may be endoge-
nously determined by rmsequilibrium strategies. In their model, the instrument that a rm can use
to inuence consumer recall is the length of time that it will hold the good for consumers at the quoted
price. In contrast to our assumption that a consumer can discover a sellers return policy only after in-
vestigating that seller, Daughety and Reinganum suppose that sellers can announce their recall policies to
the population of consumers before search begins.
7Roth and Xing (1994, page 1001) document some examples of high-pressure job o¤ers. For instance,
in the market for judicial clerkships, some judges use exploding o¤ers which would be withdrawn if they
are not accepted in some very short time, or even during the telephone conversation itself.
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the situation in which exploding o¤ers cannot be used (or when applicants can renege on
previous agreements).
2 Exploding O¤ers
Our underlying model of the market is based on Wolinsky (1986). (See Anderson and
Renault (1999) for a further development of Wolinskys model.) There are n  2 rms in
the market, each supplying a horizontally di¤erentiated product at zero production cost.
A consumers valuation of product i, ui, is a random draw from some common distribution
with support [0; umax] and with cumulative distribution function F () and density f().
We suppose that the realization of match utility is independent across consumers and
products. In particular, there are no systematic quality di¤erences across the products.
Each consumer wishes to buy one item, provided an item can be found with a positive
surplus. Both rms and consumers are assumed to be risk neutral.
Consumers initially have imperfect information about the deals available in the market.
They gather this information through a sequential search process, and by incurring a search
cost s  0, a consumer can visit a rm and nd out its price, its return policy, and match
value.8 In this section, the two return policies available to a rm are to use an exploding
o¤er or to allow free recall. (If a rm allows free recall, it sets the same price to rst-time
visitors and returning visitors.) After sampling one rm, a consumer can choose to buy at
this rm immediately or to investigate another rm. If permitted, she can costlessly return
to a previous rm after sampling subsequent rms. To implement an exploding o¤er, rms
are assumed to be able to distinguish rst-time visitors from returning customers. We
focus on symmetric situations with random search, so that a consumer is equally likely to
investigate any of the remaining unsampled rms when they search.
For expositional convenience, we introduce a piece of notation which summarizes the
distribution of match utilities and the extent of search frictions:
V (p) 
Z umax
p
(u  p) dF (u)  s : (1)
Thus, V (p) is the expected surplus of sampling a product if a consumer expects that the
price is p, the cost of sampling the product is s, and this is the only product available.
Note that V (p) is decreasing but p + V (p) is increasing in p. Throughout this paper we
assume that the search cost s is relatively small, so that
V (p) > 0 ; (2)
where p is the monopoly price, i.e., p maximizes p[1  F (p)].9 This condition means that
consumers are willing to sample a product sold even at the monopoly price. In the example
8If the search cost is zero, we require that consumers nevertheless consider products sequentially.
9Under regularity conditions (e.g., F has an increasing hazard rate), p solves the rst-order condition
p = 1 F (p)f(p) uniquely.
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where u is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], which we use for illustration at several points in
the following analysis, condition (2) requires s < 1
8
.
2.1 The free-recall benchmark
If all rms allow free recall, the situation is as in Wolinsky (1986). For reference later,
in this section we recapitulate part of his analysis. Wolinsky shows that in a symmetric
equilibrium in which all rms set the same price p0, consumers have a stationary stopping
rule whereby they buy a product immediately if they obtain a match utility u greater
than a threshold a, and if no product yields that level of utility, the consumer samples all
products and buys from the best of the n options provided that one option generates a
positive surplus. Here, the reservation utility a is determined by the formula
V (a) = 0 : (3)
The expression
R umax
a
(u  a) dF (u) in V (a) is just the incremental benet of engaging in
one more search if the best current utility is a and the consumer can freely return to this
best o¤er if the next product does not yield higher surplus. So the optimal threshold makes
the consumer indi¤erent between searching on, which incurs the cost s, and purchasing this
product with utility a. Since V () is a decreasing function, (3) has a unique solution and
a decreases with s. The search cost condition (2) is therefore equivalent to a > p.
Given that the other rms are charging the equilibrium price p0, if rm i deviates and
charges ~p, its demand is
Q =
1  F (a)n
n(1  F (a)) [1  F (a  p0 + ~p)] +
Z a
p0
F (u)n 1f(u  p0 + ~p)du : (4)
To understand this expression, consider the two sources of rm is demand. Suppose rm
i is in the kth position in a consumers search order. Then to reach the rm, the consumer
must have sampled, and rejected, k   1 rms rst, which occurs with probability F (a)k 1
(since a consumer will buy immediately if uj  a). If k < n, the consumer will buy
immediately at rm i if ui   ~p  a  p0, which occurs with probability 1  F (a  p0 + ~p).
If the rm is in the nal search position (i.e., k = n), then she will surely buy from rm
i if ui   ~p  a   p0, since then her surplus ui   ~p is positive and higher than all other
rms. Since rm i is equally likely to be in any of the search positions, the rms demand
from this source is [1  F (a  p0 + ~p)] 1n [1 +F (a) +F (a)2+   +F (a)n 1], which yields
the rst term in (4). The second source of demand comes from the scenario in which the
consumer searches all sellers and does not nd any product with net surplus greater than
a   p0. This consumer will then buy from the rm with the greatest net surplus, if this
surplus is positive. The fraction of consumers for whom this happens and then go on to
buy from rm i is
Pr(max
j 6=i
f0; uj   p0g < ui   ~p < a  p0) =
Z a p0+~p
~p
F (ui   ~p+ p0)n 1dF (ui) ;
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which equals the second term in (4) by changing variables from ui to u = ui + p0   ~p.
In equilibrium, rm i maximizes ~pQ by choosing ~p = p0, and so expression (4) implies
the rst-order condition for p0 to be the equilibrium price is10
1  F (p0)n
p0
= f(a)
1  F (a)n
1  F (a)   n
Z a
p0
F (u)n 1f 0(u)du : (5)
Assuming a strictly increasing hazard rate for the match utility (i.e., 1   F is strictly
logconcave), a nite number of rms, and condition (2), one can show that in the relevant
interval 0  p0  a, expression (5) has a unique solution, and this lies in the range
1  F (a)
f(a)
< p0 < p : (6)
As the number of rms becomes innite, the equilibrium price converges to p0 =
1 F (a)
f(a)
.
As the search cost tends to its upper bound in (2) (i.e., as a tends to p), consumers stop
searching whenever they nd a product with positive surplus and each rm acts as a
monopolist, so the equilibrium price converges to p0 = p (which then also equals
1 F (a)
f(a)
).
In the remainder of section 2, we extend this model to allow rms to use the additional
instrument of exploding o¤ers; that is to say, rms can require rst-time visitors to buy
their product immediately or not all. We discuss this issue in two stages: rst, we analyze
equilibrium prices under an assumption that all rms use exploding o¤ers, and second, we
discuss when rms do indeed have an incentive to use this high-pressure sales tactic.
2.2 Equilibrium prices with exploding o¤ers
Suppose now that the n rms force their rst-time visitors to buy immediately or not at all.
Suppose consumers anticipate that each rm sets the same price p. What is a consumers
optimal search strategy? As we will show, and as is intuitive, consumers become less choosy
as they run out of options, and their reservation utility for purchasing decreases the more
rms they have already sampled. Indeed, if they reach the nal rm they will have to
accept any o¤er which leaves them non-negative surplus.11
Given the anticipated price p, let am denote a consumers utility threshold when she
has 0  m  n   1 unsampled products remaining; that is, she will buy if her current
match utility satises u  am when she has m options remaining. Therefore, am   p
10Anderson and Renault (1999) show that, if 1  F is logconcave, the equilibrium price is increasing in
the search cost s and decreasing in the number of rms (see their Proposition 1). (However, Anderson
and Renault assume that all consumers buy one product, i.e., there is no outside option, and this a¤ects
the rst-order condition for the equilibrium price.) It is a subtle issue in this model whether second-order
conditions are satised in this candidate equilibrium. For discussion, see Proposition B2 in Anderson and
Renault (1999). However, a su¢ cient condition is that the density function f be weakly increasing.
11The stopping rule we derive in the following is discussed further in pages 166-171 in Lippman and
McCall (1976).
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is a consumers expected surplus from participating in a no-recall search market with m
products each sold at price p. Clearly, a0 = p. Recursively, when facing m+ 1 unsampled
products, if the consumer searches on and if the next product has utility greater than am,
then she will buy the next product, while if the next products utility is below am, she will
continue to search and so obtain expected surplus am   p. Hence,
am+1   p =
Z umax
am
(u  p)dF (u) + (am   p)F (am)  s ;
which simplies to
am+1 = am + V (am) : (7)
This is a rst-order di¤erence equation which governs how a consumers optimal stopping
rule evolves as she has more products remaining unsampled. The right-hand side of (7)
increases with am. Note that a1 > a0 = p whenever V (p) > 0, i.e., when p < a. In this
case, it follows from (7) that am+1 > am for all m  0, so that a consumer is willing to
accept a less suitable product as she nears the end of the search process.12 In particular, it
is possible that a consumer will end up purchasing a product with lower match utility than
a product she previously rejected. It also follows from (7) that the di¤erence am+1   am
decreases with m. Unlike the case with free recall, each am depends on price p since the
starting value a0 does so. Provided the sequence am converges as m!1 (which it always
will do if s > 0 or if u has bounded support), it will converge to the free-recall threshold
a in expression (3).
This analysis has taken as given the market price p, and we next derive the symmetric
equilibrium price. Suppose n 1 rms set the price p and one rm is considering its choice
of price, say ~p. (Of course, when choosing their search strategy consumers anticipate that
this rm has set the equilibrium price p.) Suppose this deviating rm happens to be in the
kth position of a consumers search process, so there are n  k rms remaining unsampled.
Then the probability that the consumer will visit this rm is h1  1 if k = 1, and if k > 1
this probability is
hk 
k 1Y
i=1
F (an i) : (8)
She will then buy at this rm if u  ~p > an k p, which has probability 1 F (an k p+ ~p),
and so the rms demand given it is in a consumers kth search position is
hk[1  F (an k   p+ ~p)] : (9)
12With free recall, the optimal stopping rule is stationary, and am  a given in formula (3). Thus, in
this situation consumers do not become less choosy as they near the end of the search process. In the
alternative setting of matching markets, an applicant for a job (say) may also be reluctant to search for
long because the desirable vacancies may quickly be lled.
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Since the rm is in any position 1  k  n with equal probability, its total demand with
price ~p when all other rms are expected to set price p is
Q =
1
n
nX
k=1
hk[1  F (an k   p+ ~p)] ;
and its prot is ~pQ. The rms prot is concave in its price ~p if (but not only if) each
function ~p[1   F (an k   p + ~p)] is concave in ~p. A su¢ cient condition for this is that the
density f(u) weakly increases with u.
Therefore, the rst-order condition for p to be the equilibrium price is
p =
Pn
k=1 hk[1  F (an k)]Pn
k=1 hkf(an k)
;
which can be simplied to
p =
1 Qnk=1 F (an k)Pn
k=1 hkf(an k)
: (10)
Since each an k depends on p, this equation denes p only implicitly. Note that the
numerator in (10) is equilibrium industry demand,13 while
Pn
k=1 hk is the expected number
of searches performed by a consumer. As with the free-recall case, if 1   F is strictly
logconcave, the number of rms is nite and condition (2) holds, expression (10) has a
solution in the range
1  F (a)
f(a)
< p < p :
In particular, assumption (2) implies that consumers are willing to participate in the mar-
ket. It can be shown that as the number of rms tends to innity, this equilibrium price
converges to the same lower bound 1 F (a)
f(a)
as in the free-recall case. Intuitively, when the
number of rms is unlimited, a consumer would never choose to return to a previously
sampled rm, even if she could freely do so, and so the use of exploding o¤ers then has no
e¤ect on the equilibrium price. It is also clear that as the search cost tends to its upper
bound (i.e., as a tends to p), p0 converges to the monopoly price p.
At this level of generality, it is hard to compare market performance with and without
the use of exploding o¤ers, and the comparison between the prices in (5) and in (10) is
opaque. Following Wolinsky, to gain further insights consider the case of a uniform distri-
bution for match utility. (In section 2.3, we will show that with the uniform distribution
it is an equilibrium for all rms to use exploding o¤ers.)
Uniform example: If u is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], then (7) implies
am+1 =
1
2
(a2m + 1)  s
13A consumer will leave the market without buying anything if she searched through all products and
the nal one has a utility lower than the price. The probability of that is
Qn
k=1 F (an k).
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starting with a0 = p. This di¤erence equation appears to have no analytical solution. It
converges as m becomes large to a = 1 p2s, the free-recall threshold. Except when n is
small, equation (10) has no analytical solution, but it can be solved numerically. The solid
curve in Figure 1a depicts how the equilibrium price p varies with the number of rms
when s = 0. The dashed curve represents the corresponding price (5) in the free-recall
market. Both prices converge to zero for large n, but it seems that prices with exploding
o¤ers are approximately double those which prevail with free recall. (This gure includes
the monopoly case n = 1, in which case the monopolist charges the price p = 1
2
and the
use of exploding o¤ers has no impact since consumers have only one option in any event.)
The di¤erence between the two prices is greatest for an intermediate numbers of rms. In
the same example, Figure 1b shows that the exploding-o¤er equilibrium has a higher prot
level than the free-recall equilibrium except when n = 2.14 Numerical calculations suggest
that as the search cost gets larger, the di¤erence between the exploding-o¤er and free-recall
prices decreases (and if s = 1
8
, the di¤erence vanishes). However, for any positive s < 1
8
,
a similar pattern holds, except that the exploding-o¤er equilibrium more likely leads to a
lower prot than the free-recall equilibrium when s is larger (for example, when s = 1
20
prots are lower with exploding o¤ers when n  4).
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Figure 1a: Prices with exploding o¤ers Figure 1b: Prots with exploding o¤ers
In this uniform example, aggregate consumer surplus and total welfare (measured by
the sum of consumer surplus and prot) fall when rms use exploding o¤ers. Consumer
surplus falls since the price rises compared to the free-recall situation and consumers are
prevented from returning to a product which yields positive surplus. (Even if p = p0, i.e.,
if using exploding o¤ers did not change the market price, consumers would obtain lower
surplus in the exploding-o¤er case due to the no-return restriction. The resulting higher
price p > p0 only adds to their loss.) As far as total welfare is concerned, relative to
14The reason why industry prots increase with n for small n is that with few suppliers many consumers
will not nd a product which yields them positive surplus. With monopoly, for instance, half of consumers
are excluded from the market, while with many rms almost all consumers will eventually nd a suitable
product. But with more rms prots fall with n, as the price reduction e¤ect outweighs this market
expansion e¤ect.
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the free-recall situation, the use of exploding o¤ers not only induces suboptimal consumer
search (i.e., consumers on average cease their search too early due to buy now or never
requirement, resulting in sub-optimal matching), but also excludes more consumers from
the market, both of which harm e¢ ciency.
Exponential example: To illustrate how the use of exploding o¤ers need not increase
equilibrium prices, consider a second example in which F (u) = 1   e u=, where  is the
expected value of match utility. The special feature of this distribution is that a monopoly
rm facing this population of consumers, where each consumer has an outside option with
utility z  0, will choose the same price p =  regardless of z.15 When rms use exploding
o¤ers, this immediately implies that each rm will choose p = , regardless of the number
of rms and the search cost (as long as s is relatively small such that consumers are willing
to enter the market). One can also show that the same price is chosen when there is free
recall, so that p0 =  solves expression (5) in this example for all n and a. Thus, the
use of exploding o¤ers has no impact on equilibrium prices. Nevertheless, in this example
this sales technique harms both consumers and rms, as demand and match quality are
articially restricted by the requirement that consumers cannot return to a rm. We will
see in the next section that rms will not choose to use exploding o¤ers in this example.16
2.3 Incentives to use an exploding o¤er
Here we discuss when the behaviour discussed in the previous section is in fact an equi-
librium. That is, if all its rivals set the price p in (10) and make exploding o¤ers, does a
rm have an incentive to deviate and allow free recall (and, possibly, set a di¤erent price
as well)? Before pursuing the analysis in detail, consider this simple duopoly example with
xed prices which yields the main insight.
Suppose there are two rms, both of which set the exogenous price p < a. Is a rms
demand boosted or reduced if it decides to force its rst-time visitors to buy immediately
or not at all? First, for those consumers who rst sample its rival, rm is decision whether
or not to use an exploding o¤er has no impact on its demand. Therefore, the only impact
on the rms demand comes from that half of the consumer population who sample it rst.
If rm i allows free recall, a consumer will buy from it immediately whenever ui > a, and
a consumer will return to buy from it whenever p < ui < a and ui > uj. This pattern
of demand is depicted in Figure 2a below. If, instead, rm i uses an exploding o¤er,
15This is the memorylessproperty of the exponential distribution. With price p, the monopolist will
sell to a consumer if u   p  z, and so will choose p to maximize pe (p+z)=, a choice which does not
depend on z.
16While we have been unable to make progress in comparing prices with and without exploding o¤ers with
general distributions for match utility, numerical simulations conrm that for a wide range of distributions
prices are higher when exploding o¤ers are employed. (We conjecture that this is true provided 1   F is
strictly logconcave.)
12
expression (7) implies that a consumer will buy from it if and only if ui > a1 = p+ V (p).
This pattern of demand is depicted in Figure 2b.
-
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
p
6
0 p
p
ui
uj
buy from i
buy from j
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
-
6
6
0 a1 = p+ V (p)
p
ui
uj
buy
from i
buy from j
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
Figure 2a: Demand with free recall Figure 2b: Demand with exploding o¤er
As discussed in section 2.2, a1 2 (p; a) and so the use of an exploding o¤er makes
a consumer more likely to buy immediately, but it eliminates all the returning demand.
One can calculate that when u is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], rm is demand in the
two gures is identical, and when a rm forces immediate sale this has no net impact on
its demand. More generally, the impact of using an exploding o¤er is to eliminate the
rms demand from low uiconsumers, who have match utility close to price p and might
otherwise come back, and to boost its demand from high uiconsumers, who do not wish
to risk losing the existing desirable option by going on to sample the rival. If u has an
increasing density, the latter e¤ect dominates the former, and the net impact of forcing
immediate sale is to boost a rms demand. Similarly, if the density decreases, then the
former e¤ect dominates and demand is reduced when an exploding o¤er is used.
The next result proves that this insight is valid with an arbitrary nite number of
rms.17
Proposition 1 Suppose the number of rms is 1 < n <1.
(i) If the density f is strictly increasing then the only symmetric equilibrium involves rms
using exploding o¤ers;
17Note that if there were unlimited rms in the market (n = 1), banning return or articially raising
the cost of return has no impact on a rms prot. This is because, as is well known, with unlimited
options, consumers would not choose to return to a previously sampled option even if it was free for them
to do so. As such, both equilibria with exploding o¤ers and with free recall can exist for any match utility
distribution.
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(ii) If the density f is strictly decreasing then the only symmetric equilibrium involves rms
allowing free recall;
(iii) If u is uniformly distributed then an equilibrium with exploding o¤ers and an equilib-
rium with free recall both exist.
(All omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.)
Thus, we see there are plausible cases when exploding o¤ers are used in equilibrium, as
well as other plausible cases (such as the exponential distribution considered above) when
a rm prefers to let consumers return freely after sampling rival products. In the uniform
example at least (see Figure 1a), the use of exploding o¤ers leads to higher prices being
chosen in equilibrium. In these situations, rms may choose to use exploding o¤ers and
yet consumers are harmed by the practice.18
Nevertheless, our analysis covers only situations with monotonic densities. The reason
why results are so clear-cut with monotonic densities is that the impact of exploding
o¤ers on a rms demand is unambiguous, regardless of the prevailing price. With a non-
monotonic density function, whether exploding o¤ers are an equilibrium sales technique
may depend on price. In particular, it may depend both on the number of rms in the
market and the size of the search cost. A second factor which could come into play with
non-monotonic densities is that rms may choose intermediate return policies, which make
return costly for their rst-time visitors but not prohibitively so.19 (With a monotonic
density, a rm wishes either to make return impossible or free, even if it could impose
intermediate returning costs.) As can be seen from the proof of Proposition 2 below, when
we start from the free-recall equilibrium with price p0, introducing a small return cost
boosts a rms demand if Z a
p0
F (u)n 1f 0(u)du > 0 : (11)
Whether this condition holds for non-monotonic densities depends both on the number of
rms and the search cost. Consider for example aWeibull distribution with F (u) = 1 e u3
dened on [0;1), which has a hump-shaped density with mode around 0:87. If the search
cost is high enough that a is smaller than the mode, then (11) always holds. With a
low search cost such that a = 2, then condition (11) always fails and free recall is the
equilibrium outcome. However, if the search cost is moderate so that a = 1, then condition
(11) holds for n = 2; 3 but fails for n  4. In this case, an oligopoly with few rms has an
incentive to make return costly, while a more competitive market will allow free recall.
18The use of exploding o¤ers could be prohibited by mandating a cooling o¤ period, so that consumers
have the right to return a product in some specied time after agreeing to purchase. (They could then
return a product if they subsequently nd a preferred option.) Many jurisdictions impose cooling o¤
periods for some products, especially those sold in the home.
19For example, online sellers can ask customers to log on to their accounts or input information again;
rms can ask consumers to queue again or make another appointment if they want to come back.
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Finally, this analysis relies on a rms ability to commit to an exploding o¤er. If a
consumer does come back to a rm after sampling a rival, the rm will have an incentive to
sell to that consumer. This credibility problem is enhanced by the fact that consumers often
will wish to return to previous rms, since their stopping rule is such that their remaining
option may have lower utility than previously rejected options. This commitment problem
could sometimes be solved in a dynamic environment, where sellers gain a reputation for
sticking to exploding o¤ers. (In labour market settings, for instance, some employers may
be known to keep their word.) Alternatively, in our next model in which rms set higher
prices to returning visitors rather than banning their return, we show in section 3.3 that if
rms cannot commit to their buy-laterprice then exploding o¤ers are the only credible
equilibrium whenever consumers face a positive intrinsic cost of returning to a rm. This
argument is akin to the Diamond paradox, and holds for arbitrary distributions of the
match utility (including those with decreasing densities).
3 Buy-Now Discounts
An alternative framework allows a rm to charge a higher price to returning visitors instead
of the drastic measure of banning return. Consider the same model as before, except that
instead of choosing the extreme policies of either allowing free return or no return, each
rm can choose two distinct prices: p^ is the price for returning customers and p is the price
for rst-time visitors. Whenever p^ > p, returning to a previous rm is costly.20 Indeed,
when p^ is su¢ ciently high, the rm in e¤ect uses exploding o¤ers. One interpretation of
this discriminatory pricing is that each rm sets a regular (or buy-later) price p^ and
o¤ers the rst-time visitors a buy-nowdiscount   p^   p. We assume for now that a
rm can commit to p^ when it o¤ers new visitors the buy-now price p. (We discuss the
impact of more limited commitment later in section 3.3.)
3.1 Incentives to o¤er a buy-now discount
In this section we analyze when a rm unilaterally has an incentive to o¤er a buy-now
discount  , starting from the situation in which all rms o¤er the equilibrium uniform
price p0 in expression (5). As a preliminary result, we observe that the impact of o¤ering
a small buy-now discount on a rms prot is just as if the rm levies a small buy-later
premium:
20If p^ < p, then a consumer has an incentive to leave a rm and then return, even if she has no intention
of investigating other rms. If this kind of consumer arbitrage behavior of stepping out the door and
then back in again cannot be prevented, then setting p^ < p is equivalent to setting a uniform price p^,
and so without loss of generality we assume rms are constrained to set p^  p.
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Lemma 1 Starting from the situation in which all rms o¤er the equilibrium uniform
price p0 in (5), the impact on a rms prot of o¤ering a small buy-now discount  (so
its buy-now price is p0    and its buy-later price is p0) is equal to the impact of levying a
buy-later premium  (so its buy-now price is p0 and its buy-later price is p0 + ).
Proof. Suppose all but one rm choose the uniform price p0 in (5). If the remaining
rm o¤ers the buy-now price p and buy-later price p+ , denote this rms prot by (p; ).
If p  p0 and   0 we have the rst-order approximation
(p; )  (p0; 0) + (p  p0)p(p0; 0) +  (p0; 0)
= (p0; 0) +  (p0; 0) ; (12)
where the equality follows from the assumption that p0 is the equilibrium uniform price
and subscripts denote partial derivatives. It follows that the impact on the rms prot is
captured by the term  (p0; 0), which implies the result.
Intuitively, the fact that p0 is the equilibrium uniform price implies that a rms prot is
not a¤ected by small changes in its uniform price, and the only impact on a rms prot
comes from its buy-now discount  (regardless of whether this is interpreted as a discount
for immediate purchase relative to the buy-later price p0, or as a premium for later purchase
relative to the buy-now price p0).
To illustrate the pros and cons of o¤ering a discount most transparently, consider the
case of duopoly. It is somewhat more straightforward to consider the incentive to set a
buy-later premium, and then to invoke Lemma 1. If rm i introduces a buy-later premium,
this has no impact on its demand and prot from those consumers who rst sample the
rival given they hold equilibrium beliefs, and so we can restrict attention to that portion of
consumers who sample rm i rst. A buy-later premium not only discourages consumers
from searching on, as the exploding o¤er did in the earlier analysis, but also generates
extra revenue from returning consumers.
How exactly does  a¤ect a consumers decision whether to buy immediately from rm
i? Denote by a() the reservation utility which leads the consumer to buy immediately,
i.e., if she nds match utility ui  a() at the rm she will buy without investigating the
rival. Clearly if no premium is levied ( = 0) then a(0) = a, the free-recall reservation level
in (3). By denition, if a consumer discovers utility ui = a() at rm i she is indi¤erent
between buying immediately (thus obtaining surplus a() p0) and going on to investigate
rm j, which yields expected utilityZ umax
a() 
(uj   p0)dF (uj)| {z }
utility when she buys from j
+ F (a()  )[a()  p0    ]| {z }
utility when she returns to buy from i
  s : (13)
To understand expression (13), note that if the consumer nds utility uj at the rival, she
will buy from that rm if uj   p0  a()   p0    , and otherwise she will return to buy
16
from rm i (but at the higher price p0+ ). Equating a()  p0 with expression (13) yields
the following formula for a() given  :
V (a()  ) =  : (14)
(Remember V () is dened in (1), and given  this equation has a unique solution a().)
The resulting pattern of demand for those consumers who rst sample rm i is illustrated
in Figure 3.21 Note that a() decreases with  , and by di¤erentiating (14) we obtain
a0() =
 F (a()  )
1  F (a()  ) : (15)
This is intuitive, as raising the cost of returning makes a consumer more likely to buy
immediately (just as in the extreme case of exploding o¤ers).
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Figure 3: Pattern of demand when rm i levies buy-later premium 
Using Figure 3, from those consumers who sample rm i rst the fraction who buy
from the rm is
1  F (a()) +
Z a()
p0+
F (u  )f(u)du :
21This analysis and Figure 3 presume that some consumers do return to rm i after sampling rm j,
which requires that the premium  is not too large. By examining the gure, one sees that the exact
condition is a() > p0 +  . From (14), and noting that V () is a decreasing function, this is equivalent to
 < V (p0). This is possible for su¢ ciently small  as long as V (p0) > 0, which is true given (2). When
the discount exceeds V (p0), the returning cost is so great that the consumer never returns to a rm once
she leaves it (i.e., the rm in e¤ect uses an exploding o¤er).
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By using (15), the derivative of rm is demand with respect to  is equal toZ a()
p0+
F (u  )f 0(u)du : (16)
In particular, the rms demand is boosted with a buy-later premium whenever the density
is increasing, as we saw earlier when we discussed exploding o¤ers in section 2.3.
Firm i makes revenue p0 from each of its customers, and an additional  from each of
its returning customers. It follows that the derivative of rm is prots with respect to 
evaluated at  = 0 is Z a
p0
F (u) [f(u) + p0f
0(u)] du : (17)
Here,
R a
p0
Ffdu is the extra revenue generated from the returning customers while
R a
p0
Ff 0du
is the extra (maybe negative) demand generated by increasing the cost of return.
From (17) and Lemma 1, the rm has an incentive to introduce a buy-now discount
if the density f is increasing. But it has an incentive to introduce a discount much more
generally, and the incentive is present whenever p0 in (5) is strictly above
1 F (a)
f(a)
. To see
this, use (5) to obtain
p0
Z a
p0
F (u)f 0(u)du =
1
2

p0f(a)
1  F (a)(1  F (a)
2)  (1  F (p0)2)

>  1
2

F (a)2   F (p0)2

=  
Z a
p0
F (u)f(u)du ;
where the inequality follows from the assumption that p0 >
1 F (a)
f(a)
. Thus, expression (17)
is positive and a rm has a unilateral incentive to o¤er a buy-now discount.
This result holds for arbitrary (but nite) numbers of rms:
Proposition 2 Starting from the free-recall equilibrium with uniform price p0 in (5), a
rm has a unilateral incentive to o¤er rst-time visitors a buy-now discount if p0 >
1 F (a)
f(a)
.
As discussed in section 2, a su¢ cient condition to ensure p0 >
1 F (a)
f(a)
is that the hazard
rate for the match utility is strictly increasing and that the number of rms is nite.
Proposition 2 indicates that a seller (a sales assistant in an electronics store, say)
typically has an incentive to o¤er a rst-time visitor a discount on the regular price if the
consumer buys immediately. The intuition for this result is as follows. As Lemma 1 shows,
the impact of a small buy-now discount is the same as a small buy-later premium. A small
buy-later premium has two e¤ects: the extra revenue e¤ect every returning consumer
now pays a premium, and the demand e¤ect the rst-time visitors become more likely
to buy immediately, but those potential returning consumers become less likely to come
back. The second e¤ect is similar to the demand e¤ect caused by exploding o¤ers, and as
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we have shown whether it is positive or negative depends on the shape of f . However, the
rst revenue e¤ect must be positive. Proposition 2 shows that this rst e¤ect is powerful
enough that the overall e¤ect becomes positive under a mild hazard-rate condition.
From the proof of the result one can also see that if p0 =
1 F (a)
f(a)
, then a rm has no
local incentive to introduce a buy-now discount. For instance, in the exponential example
discussed in section 2.2, we have p0 =
1 F (a)
f(a)
. Similarly, if a rm acts as a monopoly (e.g.,
when the search cost is high so that (2) is binding) or if there are innitely many rms,
then p0 =
1 F (a)
f(a)
. In all such cases, a rm has no (local) incentive to o¤er a buy-now
discount. We will also see in section 3.3 below that if the rm cannot commit to raising its
price to returning visitors, uniform pricing without buy-now discounts may often emerge
as an equilibrium outcome.
3.2 Equilibrium discounts in a duopoly example
The previous result indicated that rms have an incentive to o¤er a buy-now discount,
provided a hazard rate condition was satised. In this section we derive the equilibrium
discount and price in a duopoly setting, and compare this outcome to the situation with
uniform prices.22
For convenience, we analyze the model in terms of the buy-now price p and the buy-now
discount  = p^ p (rather than in terms of p and p^). Let the symmetric equilibrium outcome
be (p; ), and suppose rm i deviates and o¤ers an alternative tari¤ (pi;  i). Similarly to
Figure 3 above, rm is demand from those consumers who sample it rst is as depicted
on Figure 4a. (Recall that a() is dened above in (14).) Firm is demand from those
consumers who rst encounter the rival is shown on Figure 4b.
As discussed earlier, these gures presume that  ;  i  V (p). In equilibrium we will
indeed have  < V (p) so that some consumers do return to a rm after sampling the rival.
And it is without loss of generality that we consider deviations restricted to  i  V (p).23
When rm i unilaterally deviates to (pi;  i), with  i  V (p), its prot is
piQT +  iQR ; (18)
where QT is rm is total demand and QR is the portion of demand from its returning
customers. (The rm obtains revenue pi from each of its customers, plus the incremental
revenue  i from each of its returning customers.)
22When there are more than two rms, the consumer stopping rule with buy-now discounts depends
on the history of realized match utilities, and this makes the equilibrium analysis very complex. (When
exploding o¤ers are used, by contrast, the stopping rule does not depend on previous o¤ers, since the
consumer has no ability to return.)
23When  i > V (p), returning demand disappears and the rms prot is independent of  i. Hence, our
restriction to  i  V (p) is without loss of generality.
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Figure 4a: Firm is demand Figure 4b: Firm is demand
when it is sampled rst when it is sampled second
For simplicity, from now on we focus on the example in which match utility ui is
uniformly distributed on [0; 1], so that expression (14) becomes
a() = 1 +   
p
2(s+ ) : (19)
This greatly simplies the algebra and enables us to check second-order conditions for
the candidate equilibrium. (See Table 2 below for illustrations of the equilibrium when
the distribution of match utility is non-uniform.) To ensure an active market we assume
s < 1
8
.
The demand functions in (18) can be derived by calculating the areas of the various
regions in Figure 4 to yield
2QT = 1  (a( i) + pi   p)| {z }
buy immediately from i
+ a()(1  pi)  1
2
(a()     p)2| {z }
buy from i after rst sampling j
+
1
2
(a( i)   i)2   1
2
p2| {z }
returning demand 2QR
;
(20)
where a() is given in (19). Note that the rms returning demand does not depend on its
buy-now price pi over the relevant range in this uniform example. (By examining Figure
4a, we see that varying pi simply shifts the region of returning demand uniformly to the
left or right.) Note also that the rms total demand QT does not depend on its buy-now
discount  i. (This is a special case of expression (16) above, when f  1.) Thus, rm is
prot in (18) is additively separable in its buy-now price pi and its buy-now discount  i.
In particular, rm i will choose its buy-now discount  i to maximize  iQR, the extra
revenue from its returning consumers, which has rst-order condition24
24We can show that  iQR is concave in  i for  i  1=8 and decreasing in  i for  i > 1=8. So the
rst-order condition is also su¢ cient.
20
[a()   ]2   p2   2 [a()   ]
1  [a()   ] = 0 : (21)
(Here, we used expression (15).) Note that the left-hand side of (21) is strictly positive
when  = 0 (provided that s < 1
8
and p < 1
2
, and we will show shortly that p < 1
2
). It
follows that the equilibrium discount is positive, as was already indicated by Proposition
2.
Turning to the equilibrium buy-now price p, note that rm is total demand in (20) is
linear in pi, and so its prot is concave in pi. Therefore, the rst-order condition for pi to
be optimal is su¢ cient. Each rms equilibrium total demand is 1
2
[1  p(p + )]. That is,
a consumer will leave the market without buying anything if and only if she neither buys
at the second rm nor wants to go back to the rst one. Using this fact, the rst-order
condition for the equilibrium buy-now price p, given  , is
1
p
  p = 1 + a() +  : (22)
The right-hand side of (22) is greater than 3
2
.25 Since the left-hand side of (22) is decreasing
in p, it follows that the solution to this rst-order condition satises p < 1
2
. Moreover, for
0    1
8
  s, which will turn out to be the relevant range of  , the right-hand side of
(22) is decreasing in  , and so the buy-now price p in (22) is an increasing function of
 . Intuitively, a buy-now discount increases search frictions in the market, which in turn
allows rms to charge a higher price.
The equilibrium strategy (p; ) is then found by solving the pair of nonlinear equations
(21)(22), which can typically be done only numerically.26 For instance, when s = 0,
solving these equations shows that p  0:45 and   0:06 and hence a buy-later price
of p^  0:51 (which is actually slightly above the monopoly price of p = 0:5). In this
example, although the market has no intrinsic search frictions, rms in equilibrium impose
tari¤ intermediatedsearch frictions on consumers via the buy-now discount, which here
is about 12% of the buy-later price. By contrast, in a market with s = 1
8
, which is the
highest intrinsic search cost which induces consumers to participate, one can check that
the (exact) solution to this pair of equations is p = p = 1
2
and  = 0, so that there is no
buy-now discount. (When s = 1
8
, search costs are so high that consumers will accept the
rst o¤er which yields them a non-negative surplus. In particular, there are no returning
consumers even with costless recall.)
More generally, the equilibrium buy-now discount  decreases with the search cost
s. That is, the higher is the intrinsic search cost, the less incentive rms have to deter
25Note that a() +  is a convex function which is minimized by setting  = 1=8   s, which makes the
right-hand side of (22) equal to 7=4  2s. Since s < 1=8, the claim follows.
26Given s < 18 , we can show that the system of (21)(22) has a solution (p; ) 2 (0; 12 ) (0; 18   s), and
p < a()   or  < V (p) (so there do exist returning consumers in equilibrium). See our previous working
paper Armstrong and Zhou (2010) for more details.
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consumers from searching on. This can be seen from Figure 5a below, which depicts how
the buy-later price p^ = p+  (the upper solid curve) and the buy-now price p (the middle
solid curve) vary with s. As is expected, the buy-now price increases with the search cost.
Less expected is the observation that the buy-later price depends non-monotonically on s
(and is always above the monopoly price p = 1
2
in this example).
We next compare this outcome with the situation in which rms must o¤er uniform
prices to their fresh and returning customers. The equilibrium uniform price p0 is given by
expression (5), or equivalently it is given by (22) after setting  = 0. Recall that the price
which solves (22) increases with the buy-now discount  over the relevant range. Since the
equilibrium buy-now discount is positive, we deduce the following result:
Proposition 3 In the uniform-duopoly case with s < 1
8
, the use of buy-now discounts leads
to higher prices, i.e., p0 < p < p^.
That is, even the discounted buy-now price in the discriminatory case is higher than
the uniform price, and the ability to o¤er discounts for immediate purchase drives up both
prices.27 The intuition is that the buy-now discount adds to the intrinsic search frictions in
the market, and this allows rms to charge a higher price. (Relative to the uniform-price
case, consumers become less willing to search on, and so the rmsdemand is less price
elastic.) Figure 5a depicts the three prices, where from the bottom up the three curves
represent p0, p and p^, respectively. As we have already mentioned, when s = 18 the search
cost is so high that no rms have incentive to o¤er buy-now discounts, and so all three
prices coincide.
Since both prices rise, the buy-now discount equilibrium excludes more consumers from
the market. In addition, one can show that the use of buy-now discounts boosts fresh
demand (the sum of the rst two terms in (20)) and reduces returning demand. This is
illustrated for the case s = 0 in Table 1 (including for reference the case where exploding
o¤ers are used).
p p^ fresh returning excluded
no discount 0.41 0.41 41% 41% 17%
with discount 0.45 0.51 66% 11% 23%
exploding o¤er 0.45 n/a 73% 0% 27%
Table 1: The impact on prices and demand of buy-now discounts and exploding o¤ers
However, whether the use of buy-now discounts leads to higher prot depends on the
magnitude of the search cost. Figure 5b shows how industry prots with uniform pricing
(the dashed curve) and prots with buy-now discounts (the solid curve) vary with the
27It is not unusual that the ability to price discriminate in oligopoly leads to falls in all prices, but cases
where all prices rise are less familiar.
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search cost s. We see that price discrimination leads to higher prot only if the search cost
is relatively small. When the search cost is relatively high, price discrimination leads to
prices which exclude too many consumers. In these cases, rms are engaged in a prisoners
dilemma: when feasible an individual rm wishes to o¤er a buy-now discount, but when
both do so industry prots fall.28 Nevertheless, as was seen in the exploding o¤er analysis
in Figure 1b above, when there are more than two rms we anticipate that prots will rise
when buy-now discounts are used, since the price-increasing e¤ect will then outweigh the
market participation e¤ect. (When there are many rms, most consumers will eventually
nd a product they buy.)
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0.44
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0.48
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s
Figure 5a: Prices and search cost
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.38
s
Figure 5b: Prots and search cost
Finally, we observe in this example that aggregate consumer surplus and total welfare
(measured by the sum of consumer surplus and prot) fall when rms use buy-now dis-
counts.
Our analysis in this section so far has assumed that the match utility is uniformly
distributed. It is possible to derive equilibrium prices in non-uniform examples by calcu-
lating the measure, rather than simply the area, of the regions in Figure 4. We report
numerical calculations for the equilibrium tari¤ in examples where the density function
f is linear rather than constant. Specically, suppose that the density takes the form
f(u) = 2u + 1   , where u 2 [0; 1] and  2 [ 1; 1], so that the density function is a
straight line with slope 2 passing through the point (1
2
; 1). All such distributions have an
increasing hazard rate, and so Proposition 2 indicates that rms will set a positive buy-now
discount. Table 2 reports the equilibrium prices for various values of , assuming that the
search cost is zero.
28This bears some similarities to situations with competitive bundling. There, a rm often has a unilat-
eral incentive to o¤er consumers a discount for buying two products rather than one, and when all rms
do this industry prots fall. However, in contrast to the current case where the discount relaxes competi-
tion and drives prices up, with bundling the discount intensies competition and drives prices down. For
instance, see Armstrong and Vickers (2010) for more details.
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Here, the rst row reports the equilibrium uniform price, the second and third rows
report the buy-now price and buy-now discount, while the nal row reports the buy-now
discount as a proportion of the buy-later price. The central column with  = 0 is the
uniform case already discussed. As expected, when the density is increasing, the incentive
to set a buy-now discount is reinforced by an additional strategic e¤ect: as seen in (16),
with an increasing density a rms total demand is boosted if it makes it costly to return.
Thus, we see that the size of the buy-now discount increases with , both in absolute
terms and as a proportion of the buy-later price. Notice also that all prices are higher with
price discrimination than without discrimination, even when the density is decreasing. In
particular, consumers are worse o¤ with this form of price discrimination.
 =  1  =  0:5  = 0  = 0:5  = 1
p0 0.312 0.382 0.414 0.405 0.360
p 0.313 0.392 0.450 0.474 0.470
 0.017 0.032 0.060 0.091 0.124
=(p+ ) 0.05 0.075 0.12 0.16 0.21
Table 2: Equilibrium prices with a linear density function (s = 0)
3.3 Buy-now discounts without commitment
We discuss next whether buy-now discounts can emerge as an equilibrium outcome if we
relax the assumption that a rm can commit to its buy-later price when consumers rst
visit. In this case, a consumer can discover a rms actual buy-later price only after she
returns to the rm.
First, consider a situation with partial commitment, by which we mean that rms can
commit to a returning purchase price cap (but cannot commit to a specic price). This
case could apply in situations where rms can post a regularprice. For example, the
price printed on the price label in a store usually has this kind of commitment power. Here,
there is an equilibrium with the same outcome as in the full commitment case. Specically,
in this equilibrium, rms charge a buy-now price p, commit to a buy-later price cap p^, and
actually charge returning consumers p^, where both p and p^ take the same values as the
equilibrium prices in the commitment case. To sustain this equilibrium, we assume that all
consumers believe that for any (maybe o¤-equilibrium) committed price cap p^i the rms
actual buy-later price will be p^i. To see that this is an equilibrium, observe that when
consumers hold the above beliefs, they will return to a previously visited rm, say rm
i, only if ui  p^i, where p^i is the anticipated rm is buy-later price. This implies that
rm i can have no incentive to charge them a price below p^i.29 (It may have an incentive
to raise the price above p^i, but that is not permitted given that the rm commits to this
29Note that charging a returning price below p^i is a private deviation, so it will not increase the number
of consumers who return to this rm. Hence, such a deviation does not bring the rm any benet.
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cap.) This in turn fullls consumer beliefs. Thus, a buy-later price cap can be used as a
full commitment device.30
In other situations, rms may not be able to make any commitments about their buy-
later price when consumers rst visit. Here, and unlike the rest of this paper, it makes an
important di¤erence whether or not consumers face an intrinsic returning cost when they
come back to a previously-visited rm. We discuss the two cases in turn.
No intrinsic return cost: If consumers face no such cost (as we assumed for simplicity
in the rest of the paper), there are usually multiple equilibria. For example, it is a trivial
equilibrium that rms charge a su¢ ciently high returning price such that consumers never
return (i.e., all rms actually use exploding o¤ers). Given there are no returning con-
sumers, rms have no incentive to decrease the returning price. It is also possible (at least
in the uniform-duopoly example of the previous section) to construct equilibria of the con-
stant markup form which are qualitatively similar to the commitment prices: consumers
anticipate that a rm will set a return price p^i = pi +  if that rm o¤ers the buy-now
price pi, and given these expectations rms have no incentive to set a di¤erent buy-later
price. (There is a continuum of such credible  .)
However, there is often an equilibrium in which uniform pricing is a credible strategy,
so that no buy-now discount is o¤ered. That is to say, (i) consumers do not anticipate that
they will face a higher price if they return to buy from a previously sampled rm and plan
their search strategy accordingly, and (ii) when a consumer does return to a rm, that rm
has no ex post incentive to surprisethe consumer with an unexpected price hike.
First of all, this is easy to understand in the extreme case with s = 0. The reason is
that when search costs are zero, consumers sample all rms before they purchase (given
their belief that there is no returning purchase surcharge), and so all buyers are returning
customers. Thus, we are just in the situation of Wolinsky model with zero search costs, and
the incentive to set the price to returning consumers is exactly the same as the incentive
to set the uniform price p0 in (5).
Consider next cases with s > 0. For simplicity, focus on the case of duopoly. Suppose
rm i sets a slightly di¤erent buy-now price p and surprises the returning consumers with
a small premium   0.31 Consumers still hold the equilibrium beliefs that if they come
back to rm i, they will only pay p instead of p+  . Let (p; ) be rm is deviation prot
30There may exist other equilibria involving di¤erent consumer beliefs.
31We consider in this discussion only local deviations. Given that rm i has no protable local deviation,
it also has no protable global deviation if its prot function is quasiconcave in p and  , for instance.
Although in our search model it is hard to derive more primitive conditions, we can show that it is true
at least for a uniform distribution for match utility.
Note that setting  < 0 will only reduce each returning consumers payment but not increase the
returning demand since consumers observe this deviation only after they come back to the rm and all of
them value the product at ui  p. Thus, the rm will never choose to surprise a returning visitor with a
price reduction.
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when it o¤ers this alternative tari¤. When p is close to p0 and  is close to zero, as with
expression (12) above we have
(p; )  (p0; 0) +  (p0; 0) :
Thus, this deviation is unprotable if  (p0; 0) < 0. This implies that we need only consider
the deviation with an unchanged buy-now price p0 and a small buy-later premium  .
Notice the (unexpected) buy-later premium  will only a¤ect rm is returning demand,
which is depicted on Figure 6. The sole di¤erence between Figures 3 and 6 is that the
threshold for buying immediately at rm i is lower in Figure 3 than in Figure 6 it is
a() instead of a due to the fact that the consumer anticipated the buy-later premium in
Figure 3 but not in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Pattern of demand when rm i surprises return consumers with price increase 
From the gure it follows that rm is prot from the returning customers when it
increases the buy-later price by  is
(p0 + )
Z a
p0+
F (u  )f(u)du :
Hence, we have
 (p0; 0) =
Z a
p0
F (u)f(u)du  p0

F (p0)f(p0) +
Z a
p0
f(u)2du

=
Z a
p0
F (u)f(u)du  p0

F (a)f(a) 
Z a
p0
F (u)f 0(u)du

:
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(The second step follows after integrating by parts.) The rst term is just rm is returning
demand in equilibrium, so it reects the marginal benet from each returning consumer
paying the premium  . The second term is the loss due to the reduction of returning
demand caused by the unexpected premium  (some returning consumers leave the market
and some go back to buy from other rms). Compared to (17), which describes the incentive
to raise returning price in the case with commitment, the current incentive is reduced by
p0F (a)f(a). This is because in the commitment case, committing to a higher return price
can induce more consumers to buy immediately and so has an extra (strategic) demand
benet, which is absent in the no-commitment case.
Using the expression for the equilibrium uniform price (5), we obtain
 (p0; 0) =
1
2
(1  F (a))f(a)

p0   1 + F (a)
f(a)

: (23)
When the search cost is high and close to the limit in (2) (so a  p  p0), then p0  1 F (a)f(a)
and so (23) is negative. More generally, expression (23) reveals that the rm has no
incentive to deviate from uniform pricing if
p0 <
1 + F (a)
f(a)
: (24)
A su¢ cient condition for this is that
u
1 + F (u)
increases with u : (25)
(Condition (25) implies that 1 + F (u)  uf(u), and so p0 < a  1+F (a)f(a) .) For example,
(25) holds for any distribution with a weakly decreasing density (given the lower bound of
the match utility is zero as assumed in our model).32 In particular, it holds with a uniform
distribution for match utility.
It appears to be relatively hard to nd distributions for the match utility such that (24)
is violated.33 This provides one possible explanation for why in many markets uniform
prices o¤ered to rst-time and returning visitors is the norm.34 The precise reason why a
rm typically, but not always, has no incentive to raise price to returning consumers is not
transparent. The fact that a consumer has rejected the rivals product suggests that a rm
should raise its price, since it has some monopoly power over this consumer. (This is the
reason why less prominent rms set higher prices in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009).)
32One can show that a weakly decreasing density implies that uniform price is a credible equilibrium for
an arbitrary number of rms, not just for duopoly.
33One example which violates (24) is F (u) = 910u+
1
10u
100 with support 0  u  1 when s  0. When
s  0, a  1 and condition (24) requires that p0 < 210:9 . However, (5) implies that p0  0:31. Note that
this distribution has an increasing hazard rate, so this example demonstrates that the standard increasing
hazard rate condition cannot guarantee (24).
34Another possible reason why in many cases rms do not surcharge their returning customers is con-
sumersantagonism to an unexpected price rise.
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But set against this is the fact that the consumer has also rejected the rms product on a
rst visit, which tends to make the rm want to set a low price to the returning consumer.
The net impact of these two forces renders the informational motive to set high prices to
returning consumers weak or non-existent.
Positive intrinsic return cost: The preceding discussion depends on the assumption
that consumers had no cost of returning to a previously visited rm. If there is even a
small intrinsic returning cost, say r > 0, the rm has an incentive to surprisereturning
consumers with a price rise of at least r. (Returning customers all have match utility
ui > p0+r, otherwise they would not return.) It turns out that the only credible equilibrium
when r > 0 involves exploding o¤ers. To see this, suppose in some equilibrium that each
consumer forecasts that a rms buy-later price is p^(pi) when its buy-now price is pi, where
p^() can take any form. Suppose that the buy-now price in this equilibrium is p, say, and
suppose contrary to the claim there is some returning demand in this equilibrium. But
if a consumer returns to rm i after sampling other rms, her match utility must satisfy
ui  p^(p) + r, since the consumer needs to pay the returning cost r > 0. Since all its
returning customers have match utility at least as great as p^(p) + r, the rms optimal
price for these customers must be at least p^(p) + r,35 which contradicts the assumption
that p^(p) was the correctly anticipated buy-later price.
Thus, when there is an intrinsic returning cost, no matter how small, rational consumers
anticipate that buy-later prices will be so high that it is never worthwhile to return to a
previous rm after leaving it. In e¤ect, rms are forced to make exploding o¤ers, and
consumers have just one chance to buy from any rm. (The equilibrium price is then as
described in section 2.2.) This result is analogous to Diamonds (1971) paradox, showing
how a small search cost can cause a market to shut down. Diamonds result relies on
consumers knowing their match utility in advance, and a central advantage of Wolinskys
formulation with ex ante unknown match utilities is that this paradox can be avoided. But
even in our Wolinsky-type framework, the returning consumers know their match utility,
and so the returning market fails for the same reason as the primary market failed in
Diamonds framework.
4 Extensions
This paper has explored the incentives rms have to make it costly for consumers to return
after investigating rival sellers. The use of exploding o¤ers can be individually protable
for rms under certain conditions, such as when the density for match utility is increasing.
A less extreme policy is to o¤er rst-time visitors a buy-now discount, and rms have an
35Note that surprising returning consumers by charging them p^(p) + r will not induce any of them to
leave this rm again and buy from others, since going back to any other rm also involves a return cost r.
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incentive to o¤er such discounts under relatively mild conditions. Either selling technique
tends to raise market prices and lower both consumer surplus and total welfare. If rms
cannot commit to their buy-later price the outcome depends on whether there is an intrinsic
cost of returning to a rm: if the intrinsic return cost is zero, it is often an equilibrium
for rms not to o¤er a buy-now discount; if the return cost is positive, rms are forced to
make exploding o¤ers.
Several extensions to this analysis are worthwhile, including the following:
The impact of prominence: In some markets consumers are known to search in a
non-random order. For example, when one seller is more prominent than others, more
consumers may sample it rst. (Recall that De los Santos (2008) showed how one seller in
the online book market attracted a greatly disproportionate share of initial searches.)
In the model of exploding o¤ers, prominence does not a¤ect a rms incentive to adopt
exploding o¤ers if the utility density is monotonic. It can be understood by looking at
Figure 2 for the duopoly case. The decision about whether or not to use an exploding o¤er
only a¤ects a rms demand from consumers who sample it rst, and this demand e¤ect is
positive (negative) if the density is increasing (decreasing), independent of the proportion
of such consumers. However, prominence does a¤ect the equilibrium price when exploding
o¤ers prevail. Intuitively, rms placed earlier positions in the consumer search order should
have incentive to charge lower prices than their rivals. This is because consumers who face
exploding o¤ers are more choosy at the start of their search process, and so the demand
faced by prominent rms is more price elastic.36 This result is akin to the prominence
model with free recall analyzed in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009).
In the model of buy-now discounts, the situation is more complicated, because rms
also care about the extra revenue generated by the high-price returning customers. In the
duopoly example analyzed in section 3.2, one can show numerically that when s = 0 the
prominent rms buy-now discount decreases from 0:06 to 0:053 as its share of rst-time
visitors increases from 50% to 100%, while the less prominent rms buy-now discount
increases from 0:06 to 0:063. That is, the less prominent rm will actually o¤er a deeper
buy-now discount than its rival.
More ornate schemes: In the buy-now discount model, sellers may be able to extract
more surplus from buyers by o¤ering them an additional option namely, buyers can pay
a deposit d for the option to return and buy at a specied price q.37 With this new
option, more consumers may opt to search on, and among the consumers who do search
36This implies that if consumers can choose their search orders freely, the no-recall model with ex ante
symmetric rms also has asymmetric equilibria (in addition to the symmetric equilibrium discussed in
section 2.2) in which consumers sample a certain rm rst and this rm then provides better deals.
37For example, some business schools demand a deposit from applicants who want to keep the admission
o¤er for a longer time. It is also sometimes used in business-to-business transactions.
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on, those having relatively high valuations of the rst product will buy the deposit contract
while others having relatively low valuations will not since they rarely come back. In the
uniform-duopoly example, one can show that: (i) starting from the buy-now discount
equilibrium in section 3.2, each rm has an incentive to introduce a deposit contract; (ii)
the purchase price in the deposit contract is even lower than the buy-now price (i.e., q < p)
but the consumers who buy the deposit contract and eventually come back pay more than
fresh consumers (i.e., d + q > p); (iii) with the new instrument rms earn lower prot
in equilibrium. This extension could be extended further, so that rms o¤er a menu of
deposit contracts (a bigger deposit would grant the right to come back and buy at a lower
price). Nevertheless, the informal and perhaps furtive nature of buy-now discounts will
often make the use of these ornate contracts implausible in practice.
Other forms of search-based discrimination: In this paper we assumed that rms
can distinguish rst-time from returning visitors. In some situations, rms may be able
to distinguish more nely between consumers, and can further identify whether a rst-
time visitor has previously sampled other sellers or not. (For instance, an online rm may
be able to track whether a consumer has previously paid it a visit and whether she has
already visited some rivals.) In the duopoly case, one can show that each rm will charge
the same price to returning consumers and its rst-time visitors who have sampled the
rival rm rst, and charge a lower price to the rst-time visitors who sample it rst. Thus,
in equilibrium a rm discriminates equally against all consumers who have investigated the
rival seller, regardless of whether or not the consumer rst sampled the rival.38
Consumersincentives to conceal/reveal their search history: Notice that from an
ex ante perspective, in both of our models a consumer will be better o¤ if she can conceal
her identity as a returning consumer.39 Thus, if it is costless to pretend to be a new visitor
(e.g., by deleting cookies on your computer), all consumers will do this, and the market
will operate as a standard search market with uniform prices as in Wolinsky (1986). But
if there are some costs involved in concealing search history, or if some consumers do not
think to do so, there will remain an incentive to condition prices on observed search history.
Consumers may also have incentive to (selectively) reveal their search history. For
instance, they may want to force the current seller to o¤er a better deal by providing
hard information of a previous price o¤er (if this is possible).40 Investigating how such a
38See our previous working paper Armstrong and Zhou (2010) for more details.
39This is somewhat related to models of sequential bargaining. If one buyer is negotiating with a sequence
of sellers, then the buyer may gain from keeping the order (and the outcome) of negotiations secret from
sellers. Noe and Wang (2004) present such a model, and nd that when the objects sold are complements
for the buyer, then the buyer obtains greater surplus if he randomizes and conceals the order in which he
approaches the sellers.
40In Daughety and Reinganum (1992), if a consumer makes contact with two sellers, she can force the
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possibility could a¤ect price competition and market performance is an interesting topic
for future investigation.
High-pressure selling to conceal information about match utility: A focus of
this paper has been on a sellers strategic incentive to prevent a consumer from acquiring
information about rival o¤erings. By making it hard to return to a rm, a consumer is
reluctant to go on to investigate other deals. An alternative form of high-pressure selling
is to force a potential customer to buy quickly, before she has had a chance to evaluate
the current product adequately. (This seems to be a reason for the sales techniques used
by time-share companies, for instance.) If a seller forces consumers to decide quickly (or
o¤ers a discount if they buy quickly), a consumer might have to decide whether or not to
purchase before she has worked out how much she actually wants the product. Without
accurate information about the realized match utility, suppose that a consumer bases her
purchase decision on the expected match utility, which is u, say.
This setting can be analyzed within a monopoly framework (unlike our main model).
Suppose the monopolist has marginal cost c for supplying the product. If the seller gives the
consumer time to calculate her (privately observed) match utility u, the sellers prot with
price p is (p  c)(1 F (p)), and the optimal price maximizes this expression. If instead the
seller forces the consumer to buy immediately or never knowing only her expected utility,
the seller can charge p = u and obtain prot u   c. Since u > p(1   F (p)) for all p, it
follows that the latter strategy is more protable whenever c is su¢ ciently close to zero.
By contrast, if c is su¢ ciently large (above u, for instance), then the monopolist prefers to
give consumers enough time to understand the realized match utility.41
One can also consider a search version of this problem. Consider the Wolinsky model,
but suppose a consumers initial search is costless so that all consumers are willing to
participate in the market. When marginal production cost c is small enough, it turns out
to be an equilibrium for all rms to force sales before the consumer discovers her utility
and to fully extract expected utility with the monopoly price p = u. (Suppose all other
rms do so. Then when a consumer arrives at a seller, she will never search further.
So the seller acts as a monopolist and, as we have seen, its most protable strategy is
then to force a quick sale to conceal match-specic information.42) Even with very small
search costs, then, all rms engage in this form of high-pressure selling, with undesirable
results: consumers are left with no surplus; even low-u consumers buy, despite the costs
sellers to compete in Bertrand fashion and force her price down to marginal cost.
41For further details of the monopolists incentives to reveal or conceal match-specic information, see
Lewis and Sappington (1994). They show that the monopolist typically will choose to reveal all information
or none. Anderson and Renault (2009) discuss when a rm wishes to disclose match-specic information
to consumers about a rivals product.
42It is therefore clear that if c is large enough (above u, say), this hihg-pressure selling equilibrium
cannot be sustained.
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of serving them, and consumers are randomly matched with sellers rather than buying the
most suitable product. Thus, even in a search market with di¤erentiated products as in
Wolinsky (1986), if rms have the ability to conceal match-specic information by means
of high-pressure sales techniques they will often choose to do so, and the Diamond Paradox
emerges once again.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i): Our proof consists of two steps. First, we show that
if the match utility density f is strictly increasing, then all rms using exploding o¤ers is
an equilibrium. Second, we exclude the possibility that all rms allowing free recall is also
an equilibrium.
The hypothesis is that all rms choose to use exploding o¤ers and to set the price p
in (10). Suppose a deviating rm chooses price ~p and allows free recall, while other rms
follow the proposed equilibrium strategy. Suppose that the deviating rm is in the kth
position of a consumers search process and k < n. (If k = n then allowing free recall or
not does not a¤ect the rms demand.) Then the probability that this consumer will visit
the rm is still hk in (8), since consumers hold equilibrium beliefs. However, her incentive
to search beyond the rm is now altered. Since she can return to this rm whenever she
wants, she becomes more willing to continue searching. If at the deviating rm she nds
utility u such that u  ~p  0, she will never buy from the rm (either immediately or later).
So consider the situation where u   ~p > 0. Then if she leaves the deviating rm, she will
enter a no-recall search market with n   k products each being sold at price p, but now
with an outside option u  ~p. To calculate the consumers stopping rule in this situation,
we need to calculate her expected surplus from entering such a search market.
Denote by Wm(z) the expected surplus from a no-recall search market with m unsam-
pled products with price p and outside option z  0. It is di¢ cult to derive an explicit
expression for Wm(z), and instead we use an indirect method.43 Let rm(z) be the proba-
bility that the consumer will eventually consume the outside option. By standard envelope
reasoning we have the following result.44
Claim 1 Wm(z) is convex and W 0m(z) = rm(z) almost everywhere.
43By contrast, it is straightforward to derive an explicit expression for consumer surplus in the case of
free recall see expression (30) below.
44A sketch of a proof goes as follows. Let m be the set of all possible stopping rules in the no-recall
search market with m products and outside option z. If the consumer uses  2 m, her expected surplus
is zR() + U(), where R() is the probability that the consumer will opt for z given the stopping rule
, and U() is the surplus from buying other products (including the expected search costs). Thus,
Wm(z) = max2m [zR() + U()] and rm(z) = R((z)), where (z) is the optimal stopping rule given z.
Wm(z) is convex since the objective function is linear in z, and its derivative is rm(z) almost everywhere.
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Notice thatWm(0), the expected surplus from a no-recall search market with a zero outside
option, is just am   p. Thus, we have
Wm(z) = am   p+
Z z
0
rm(x)dx :
Since 0 < rm(z)  1, Wm(z) is an increasing function with slope no greater than one. In
addition, since the consumer can always consume the outside option without searching at
all, we have Wm(z)  z. In particular, for a su¢ ciently large z (e.g., z  umax   p), the
consumer will consume the outside option immediately, so Wm(z) = z. Hence, we can
deduce that Wm(z) = z and rm(z) = 1 for z  zm, where zm = inffz : Wm(z) = zg and
zm 2 (am   p; umax   p). For z < zm, the consumer will search and so rm(z) < 1.
When the deviating rm occupies the kth position in a consumers search order, the
consumer will buy from it immediately if and only if u ~p  Wn k(u ~p), i.e., if u ~p  zn k,
where zn k, according to its denition, satises
zn k = an k   p+
Z zn k
0
rn k(x)dx : (26)
Thus, the rms demand when it is in the kth position, charges price ~p and permits free
return, is
hk

1  F (zn k + ~p) +
Z zn k+~p
~p
rn k(u  ~p)f(u)du

= hk

1  F (zn k + ~p) +
Z zn k
0
rn k(u)f(u+ ~p)du

; (27)
where the equality follows after changing variables in the integral. Compared to the demand
generated with an exploding o¤er given in (9), it now has reduced immediate demand since
zn k > an k   p, but has positive returning demand comprised of the integral term.
Claim 2 Demand in (27) is smaller than that in (9) if f is strictly increasing.
Proof. We need to showZ zn k
0
rn k(u)f(u+ ~p)du < F (zn k + ~p)  F (an k   p+ ~p) : (28)
Dene
(u)  zn k + ~p 
Z zn k
u
rn k(x)dx :
Note that 0(u) = rn k(u), (zn k) = zn k + ~p, and (0) = an k   p + ~p (which follows
from (26)). Then the right-hand side of (28) can be written asZ zn k
0
rn k(u)f((u))du :
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Since (u) > u + ~p (because rn k(x) < 1 for x < zn k), expression (28) holds if f is an
increasing function.
Therefore, for any price ~p, unilaterally allowing free recall causes the deviating rms
demand (and hence prot) to fall when f is increasing. (This is true regardless of the rms
position in a consumers search order, except when it is in the nal position in which case
the use of exploding o¤ers makes no di¤erence to the rms demand.) It follows that an
equilibrium in which all rms use exploding o¤ers exists.
The second step is to exclude the possibility of a free-recall equilibrium when f is
strictly increasing. We show that, starting from the hypothetical free-recall equilibrium
with price p0, each rm has a unilateral incentive to use an exploding o¤er no matter what
position it is in the consumers search process (except when it is in the nal position).
As in expression (4), a rms demand, if it is in the kth position of the consumers search
process with k < n, is
F (a)k 1[1  F (a)] +
Z a
p0
F (u)n 1f(u)du : (29)
The rst term is demand when the consumer buys the rms product immediately, and the
second term is demand when the consumer rst leaves the rm but eventually comes back.
Suppose now that the rm unilaterally uses an exploding o¤er but still charges the price p0.
(We will show the rms prots increase with this deviation, and hence the hypothetical
equilibrium is not valid. The rms prots would increase still further if it altered its price
as well.) Dene   maxf0; u1  p0;    ; uk 1  p0g. Then the consumer will visit the rm
if and only if  < a p0. If she nds match utility u at the rm, she will buy (immediately)
if u  p0 is greater than the expected surplus from searching further.
Denote by Vm (z) the expected surplus from participating in a free-recall search market
with m products o¤ered at price p0 and an outside option z < a  p0. Then45
Vm (z) = z +
Z a
z+p0
[1  F (u)m]du : (30)
One can check that z  Vm (z) < a  p0.
45The consumer will stop searching before she runs out of options if and only if she nds a product with
match utility greater than a. (This is true regardless of z provided that z < a  p0.) Her expected surplus
is therefore
Vm (z) = [1  F (a)m]  [E (uju  a)  p0] + Pr (u < a)  E [maxfu   p0; zgju < a]  sT;
where u = maxfu1;    ; umg and T = [1  F (a)m] = [1  F (a)] is the expected number of searches. The
rst term is the surplus when the consumer ends up buying a product with match utility higher than
a, and the second term is the surplus when she ends up sampling all rms. From the denition of the
reservation utility a in (3), we have s = [1  F (a)] [E (uju  a)  a]. Substituting this into Vm(z) yields
the formula.
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The consumer will buy from rm i if and only if u   p0  Vn k(). Here,  is the
consumers outside option if the consumer leaves the rm and continues searching (since
the rm is using an exploding o¤er). The c.d.f. of  dened on [0; umax   p0] is G() 
F (+p0)
k 1, which has a mass point at zero. Therefore, the deviating rms demand when
it is in the kth position is
Pr ( < a  p0 and u  p0 > Vn k()) (31)
= G(0)[1  F (p0 + Vn k(0))] +
Z a p0
0
[1  F (p0 + Vn k())]dG()
d
d
= F (a)k 1[1  F (p0 + Vn k(a  p0))] +
Z a
p0
f(p0 + Vn k(x  p0))V 0n k(x  p0)F (x)k 1dx ;
where the second equality follows after integrating by parts and changing the integral
variable. According to the denition of Vm() in (30), we have Vn k(a  p0) = a  p0 and
Vn k(x  p0) = x  p0 +
Z a
x
[1  F (u)n k]du ; V 0n k(x  p0) = F (x)n k :
Substituting these into (31) shows that the rms demand is
F (a)k 1[1  F (a)] +
Z a
p0
F (x)n 1f

a 
Z a
x
F (u)n kdu

dx : (32)
Since a   R a
x
F (u)n kdu > x for x < a, one can see that if f is strictly increasing
(we actually only need f to be strictly increasing on [p0; a]), demand in (32) is strictly
greater than demand in (29). Therefore, the rm does have an incentive to deviate from
the supposed free-recall equilibrium. This completes the proof of part (i). Parts (ii) and
(iii) can be proved in a similar manner.
Proof of Proposition 2: We will show that a rm has an incentive to introduce a small
buy-later premium, and then invoke Lemma 1 to show that the rm also has an incentive to
o¤er a small buy-now discount. Compared to the duopoly case analyzed in the main text,
the additional analysis needed for the general n-rm case involves the extra complexity of a
consumers stopping rule. In particular, the consumers stopping rule at a rm which o¤ers
a buy-later premium will depend on the history of o¤ers she sees before she encounters the
rm, and this feature is absent in the duopoly analysis.
Let p0 be the price in the free-recall equilibrium dened by (5). Assumption (2) implies
that p0 < a. We rst consider this hypothetical search problem:
A search problem: Suppose the consumer encounters rm i rst, and is o¤ered match
utility ui, the buy-now price p0, and a buy-later premium  > 0 (so the buy-later
price at rm i is p^ = p0+  .) Suppose she expects that all m remaining rms charge
price p0 < a and allow free recall, and suppose the consumer has an outside option
 < a  p0. What is her optimal stopping rule at rm i?
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It is clear that (a) if ui  a, the consumer will surely stop searching and buy at rm
i immediately (this is even true when  = 0); and (b) if ui   p0  , then rm is o¤er
is dominated by the outside option and the consumer will not buy from the rm (either
immediately or later), and she will keep searching since  < a  p0.
Now consider the intermediate case with ui   p0 2 (; a   p0). If the consumer buys
immediately at rm i, her payo¤ is ui   p0. If she leaves rm i, she will begin a free-recall
search process with m rms and an outside option
z = maxf; ui   p^g < a  p0 :
(Recall she will pay the higher price p^ > p0 if she returns to buy from rm i.) As before,
the expected surplus Vm(z) from entering this search market is given by (30). Given , z
is a function of ui and we can therefore regard Vm(z) as a function of ui: it is at until
ui reaches  + p^ and then increases with ui with slope less than one. (Note that we are
considering the case with ui < a, so the slope cannot be equal to one.) Recall from (30)
that for z < a  p0, z < Vm(z) < a  p0.
Clearly, the consumer will buy immediately from rm i if and only if
ui   p0  Vm(maxf; ui   p^g) : (33)
Given the properties of Vm(), the equality of (33) has a unique solution am() 2 (+p0; a).
We conclude that the consumer will buy immediately from rm i if and only if ui  am().
There are then two cases, depending on the size of the premium  :
(i) If ui   p0 crosses Vm(z) at the at portion, which occurs when  + p^   p0 > Vm()
or  > Vm()  , then
am() = p0 + Vm() ; (34)
which does not depend on  . In this case, the consumer will never return to rm i once
she leaves because ui   p^ is dominated by . Therefore,  is so large that rm i has no
returning demand.
(ii) If ui  p crosses Vm(z) at the increasing portion, which occurs when   Vm()  ,
then am() is implicitly determined by am()  p0 = Vm(am()  p0   ), which from (30)
implies am() satises
 =
Z a
am() 
[1  F (u)m]du ; (35)
which does not depend on p0 or . In particular, am(0) = a. Expression (35) is the
generalization beyond duopoly of our earlier formula (14). In this case, the consumer will
initially reject rm is o¤er if ui < am(), but will come back to the rm after sampling the
remaining m rms if ui  p^ > max1jmf; uj p0g.46 Note that the assumption  < a p0
implies that Vm()   > 0, and so case (ii) is relevant for all su¢ ciently small  > 0.
In sum, we deduce the following result:
46Note that once the consumer leaves rm i, she has the outside option z < a  p0 and so she will never
come back before sampling all the remaining m rms.
36
Claim 3 In this hypothetical search problem, the consumer will buy from rm i imme-
diately if and only if ui  am(), where am() is dened in (34) if  > Vm()    and
otherwise am() is dened in (35).
Finally, since Vm()   is decreasing in , the condition  > Vm()   is equivalent to
 2 ( ; a  p0), where  solves
 = Vm( )   =
Z a
+p0
[1  F (u)m]du (36)
if  < Vm(0), and  = 0 otherwise. In particular, Vm(0) = 0 = a  p0.
We now prove Proposition 2. Starting from the free-recall equilibrium with price p0,
suppose rm i unilaterally introduces a returning purchase premium  > 0 but keeps the
buy-now price unchanged at p0. Suppose rm i happens to be in the kth position of the
consumers search process. If k = n, then  has no impact on rm is prot. In the
following, we show that for any k < n, introducing a small premium  > 0 is protable for
the rm.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, let   maxf0; u1 p0;    ; uk 1 p0g be the best o¤er
from the previous k   1 rms. A consumer will visit rm i if  < a  p0. If the consumer
arrives at rm i and discovers match utility ui and the buy-later premium  (but still
holds the equilibrium belief about the remaining n k rmspolicies), she faces the search
problem we have just analyzed with m = n  k, and her stopping rule will depend on her
best previous o¤er . Let us focus on a relatively small  such that  < Vn k(0) and dene
 as in (36) with m = n   k. Then if  2 ( ; a   p0), the reservation utility according
to (34) is an k() = p0 + Vn k(). In this case, the consumer will buy immediately if
ui  an k(), and otherwise she will keep searching and never come back. Alternatively, if
   the reservation utility an k() is as given in (35) with m = n  k. In this case, even
if the consumer leaves rm i rst (i.e., if ui < an k()), she will eventually come back after
sampling all remaining rms if ui   p0    is greater than their o¤ered surplus and the
outside option  which represents the best o¤er among the previous k 1 rms. Explicitly,
rm is returning demand in this case is
Pr(max
j>k
f; uj   p0g < ui   p0    < an k()  p0   )
=
Z an k()
p0+
F (ui   )n 1dF (ui) =
Z an k() 
p0
F (u)f(u+ )du :
(Note  is also a random variable with c.d.f. G() = F ( + p0)k 1, and the second step
follows after changing the integral variable.) Therefore, rm is prot if it is in the kth
search position and charges the buy-later premium  is
p0
Z a p0

[1  F (p0 + Vn k())] dG() + p0G( )[1  F (an k())]
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+ (p0 + )
Z an k() 
p0
F (u)n 1f(u+ )du : (37)
Note from (35) that
(1  a0n k(0))(1  F (a)n k) = 1 : (38)
By using the observations Vn k(0) = 0 = a  p0 and (38), the derivative with respect to
 of rm is prot in (37) when it is in the kth position (with k < n), evaluated at  = 0, isZ a
p0
F (u)n 1[f(u) + p0f 0(u)]du ; (39)
which generalizes the duopoly expression (17). Here,
R a
p0
F n 1fdu is the extra revenue
generated from the returning customers, while
R a
p0
F n 1f 0du is the extra demand generated
by increasing the cost of return. That (39) is positive when p0 >
1 F (a)
f(a)
follows the
argument given in the main text for duopoly. Since (39) is positive (and the same) for all
k < n, the proof is complete.
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